The Shinseki Myth:

Senate Armed Services Committee Testimony, 06/25/2004

SEN. CLINTON: At some point, Mr. Secretary, will there be any kind of after-action review by the civilian leadership in the Pentagon with respect to this mission? You know, certainly those of us who heard General Shinseki, who at the time was the Army chief of staff, testify, based on his best knowledge and experience, the numbers that were needed, have to conclude there was at least a debate within the professional military. Now how that debate was determined -- obviously, we have a regime of civilian leadership -- is obviously clear. But I'd think to dismiss out of hand testimony we heard with our own ears and testimony that was very compelling and led to the public embarrassment of a distinguished soldier is a little bit difficult for us to accept.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: I'm sorry. I don't think to disagree with someone should be publicly embarrassing. General Shinseki was in fact disagreeing with all of his colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commander, General Franks. Isn't that right, General Myers?

GEN. MYERS: Actually, we didn't -- as we discussed about troop strength with then -- the commander, General Franks, which we did many times during the planning, during conflict, and then for post-conflict and then later on, with General Abizaid, the issue of more troops never came before -- never was brought up in our deliberations. Nobody said, "You need more." It was General Franks that proposed what he thought was right. We'd have discussions and talk about it, and then we'd provide our military advice to the secretary and the deputy secretary. But there was never a push inside the Joint Chiefs of Staff for more forces.

SEN. CLINTON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator, that you raise that question which -- continually raised about General Shinseki's figure. And my own independent research on that reveals that -- I'm not questioning the integrity of that fine officer -- but I cannot find any trace of the Joint Staff ever discussing a figure of the magnitude that he mentioned right from that seat you're in, Secretary Armitage, nor in the Army and its deliberations, of a figure of that nature. If I'm wrong, let somebody show me the documents that support that anywhere in that building that figure was discussed and carefully thought through...

John Batiste: Then vs. Now

1. Batiste on CNN 10/06/2004:
PHILLIPS [CNN]: General, while we watch the successful operations go down side by side with Iraqi troops, of course we continue to see a lot of violence throughout Iraq. We see children being targeted and, most recently, Ambassador Paul Bremer coming forward saying there was a mistake in the strategy in Iraq, and there just weren't enough troops post Saddam Hussein.

Do you agree with that?

BATISTE: Let me answer that by saying that while we were conducting the operation in Samarra, at the same time we were conducting a battalion task force level air assault into an objective in the vicinity of Sharkak (ph), at the same time we were conducting a battalion level operation in the vicinity of Muqdadiyah. And at the same time, we were conducting a battalion level operation south of Balad. So, I think we had plenty of flexibility. Add to that the Iraqi security forces. They really do bring a lot to the fight now.

2. Batiste, 12/24/2004:
Afterward, Rumsfeld flew off for Tikrit in a UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter flanked by an aerial security escort. Army Maj. Gen. John Batiste, commander of the 1st Infantry Division, met Rumsfeld in Tikrit, where the secretary also met with troops. Batiste told Rumsfeld that he was "comfortable we're heading in the right direction" regarding security issues for the upcoming Iraqi elections slated for January.

3. Batiste, 12/24/2004:
Rumsfeld visits 1st Division in Tikrit. MajGen. Batiste: "It is an honor to welcome to the 1st Infantry Division our country's 23rd Secretary of Defense, The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld. This is a man with the courage and the conviction to win the war on terrorism..."

4. Batiste, 01/13/2005:
"Together with civic, tribal and religious leaders, the Iraqi security forces have achieved irreversible momentum towards prosperity and representative government. Based on the competencies of the Iraqi team, I am confident in the future of Iraq. We are right where we need to be in this important mission."

5. Batiste, 01/13/2005:
"Tony Capaccio with Bloomberg News, sir....on the helicopters, how many did you have three weeks ago, and how many do you have today, to give a sense of buildup there for quick reaction?

GEN. BATISTE:"... I'm not going to give you numbers. But suffice it to say I've got twice what I had, and it's more than enough."

6. Batiste, 04/13/2006:
BATISTE:...It is much harder than warfare, and you need to have sufficient troops on the ground to control the people, to secure the borders, to intimidate the insurgency, to own the ground in every respect. My area in Iraq was the size of the state of West Virginia, huge. And we were forced over time to conduct a series of movements to contact where we only controlled the ground for a moment in time; that's not how you fight an insurgency.

JIM LEHRER: Did you ask for more troops?

MAJ. GEN. JOHN BATISTE: We always asked for more troops, within our chain of command.

JIM LEHRER: And what happened when you asked for more troops?

MAJ. GEN. JOHN BATISTE: We saluted and executed; I had to keep my soldiers alive and focused on the mission at hand.

JIM LEHRER: As you know, Secretary Rumsfeld has said from the beginning every time the military asked for more troops in Iraq, they were given what they wanted. Not true in your case?

MAJ. GEN. JOHN BATISTE: I suspect, going way back five years to the beginning of this whole war, there were ample times when people said to him, as General Shinseki did, "We need more." In the case of General Shinseki, he was retired early. And as I recall, the secretary didn't even go to his retirement ceremony; I have never forgotten that.

7. Batiste, 04/14/2006:
"We went to war with a flawed plan that didn't account for the hard work to build the peace after we took down the regime. We also served under a secretary of defense who didn't understand leadership, who was abusive, who was arrogant, who didn't build a strong team."

8. Batiste [courtesy David Axe, DefenseTech.org, 4/13/2006]:

I met Batiste a year ago when he was commander of the 1st Infantry Division in Iraq. We spoke for an hour about the insurgency, the Iraqi Army and the upcoming January election for an interim national assembly. The difference between Batiste's attitude then and his attitude now is suprising. Last year, he said the insurgency was "not an impressive effort", insisted that Al Qaeda was behind the worst attacks in Iraq and predicted that everday Iraqis would soon turn against insurgents. And the kicker -- he described the chunk of the World Trade Center that he kept in his office to remind himself why we had to invade Iraq. From the safety of retirement, and with his buddies watching his back, Batiste has lashed out at Rumsfeld. But Batiste is guilty of lapses in judgement just as gross as Rumsfeld's. The only difference is that Rumsfeld ranks higher, so his lapses have greater consequences. I'm not defending Rummy. But if Batiste were Secretary of Defense instead, I doubt we'd be much better off.

Below are excerpts of my interview with Batiste:

Q: What is the insurgent strategy?

BATISTE: I haven't seen an insurgent strategy. I've seen disparate efforts. A piece of me says that we give them too much credit.

Q: What is the gravest threat [in the 1st Infantry Division area of operations]?

BATISTE: Al Qaeda.

Q: How are Iraqi security forces shaping up?

BATISTE: The enemy ... he's a coward, is what he is. It's not an impressive effort, and these great Iraqi security forces are figuring that out.

Q: What does a successful election mean for Iraq?

BATISTE: A good election is a huge victory. Our challenge is to give Iraqis an alternative to an insurgency. You know, I carry a piece of the World Trade Center ... to remind me why we're here.

Q: Why are we here?

BATISTE: To end radical Islamic fundamentalism.

Q: But wasn't Saddam Hussein's regime hostile to radical Islamists?

BATISTE: We could argue about that all night.

[end of interview]

http://www.defensetech.org/archives/002322.html

Finally, let's give Generals Abizaid and Casey the last world on the "More troops" question.

1. Abizaid, 04/30/2004:
Q General Abizaid, Bret Baier from Fox News Channel. I wanted to ask you -- obviously, there have been a lot of critics out there saying that you need more troops on the ground. Whenever we ask somebody here in the Pentagon or throughout the administration, they say if General Abizaid asks for it, he's going to get it. Do you have enough troops in Iraq? Why haven't you asked for more beyond the extension? And are you pleased with the number currently?

GEN. ABIZAID: ...So asking the question about do we need more capacity in Iraq, we need more Iraqi security capacity and we need more international security capacity. I think many of you have heard me say on a number of occasions that I do not favor large increased numbers of American troops unless they have to deal with an immediate security problem, which is what we currently have. I do favor the inclusion of more international troops, especially more Muslim troops... I believe, and I think Iraqis will second me on this, this needs to be less of an American occupation and more of an international military activity that includes Iraqis,international forces and Americans. Am I comfortable with where we are now? Militarily, yes. If the situation were to move into less secure circumstances than are currently visible in the country, I would go to the secretary and ask for more forces, and General Sanchez agrees with me on that. But I don't see a need to do that now.

2. Casey, 06/27/2005:
"GEN. CASEY:...I went around to visit all the division commanders just prior to coming back and asked them, one, how's the situation, how are things going? And to a person, they all responded that this is moving in the right direction in their areas. Then I asked them did they have enough troops to do what they needed to do. And to a person, they all said they had what they needed to get the job done."

Thanks, Reg,

I keep wondering how much of the recent complaints are political opportunism, and how much because it's sinking into some people's heads that war has changed, and that we may never again send a corps into battle. Or maybe even a division.

And that having soldiers "fight" by building sewers and worrying about trsh collection and handing out soccer balls is not a temporary abberation, but the way it's going to be for the foreseeable future...

This is a very, very interesting discussion; however, calls for troop increases aside, I can tell you from PERSONAL experience that more than a few senior Army officers--and please drop the "those who are afraid they won't command a Corps" rhetoric, ok? that's just specious--anyway, more than a few I know of or know personally are having a hard time deciding if they want to stay in or get out... The problems are nothing like as simplistic as you all have presented them here, and while I agree that the arguments you've placed are good, they miss the point that Rumsfeld has alienated a LARGE portion of the professional Army, when he did not need to. This is not hyperbole, nor supposition. You can pooh-pooh it all you want, you can take the argument whereever you want, but people who know the Army know that the criticisms of Rumsfeld are not misguided, nor especially self-serving. If you knew the Army, you would be more amazed that these men have come out at all to speak about him.. Just shows anyone can make a good argument if the parameters are narrowly focused enough, I suppose... I suggest a bit more digging, maybe some talks with people at the O4, O5, O6 level...

V/R

And BTW, upon reflection, this is absolutely at the heart of the matter, but not in the way one might suppose:

"And that having soldiers "fight" by building sewers and worrying about trsh collection and handing out soccer balls is not a temporary abberation, but the way it's going to be for the foreseeable future..."

This is NOT what soldiers are for. Soldiers are for fighting, or at least being able to fight, and so are therefore a deterrant; Civil Affairs is civil affairs, and it is a crying shame that the finest fighting force in the world--bar none--is being used for trash collection and handing out soccer balls... Certainly that is a good thing for people to do; it's always better to make friends by being able to kill them but not doing so, than to have to kill them, but in fact, a lot of soldiers are just plain aggravated at the civil affairs side of the job. An army is for fighting, not peacekeeping, which is nothing more than a glorified guard's job.

And to come back to the Officers (and I'll add Senior NCOs), whether one likes the notion or not, some people are professional soldiers, the way others are professional accountants, and as such are more than a little justified in asking to be treated like they have a clue that maybe the senior civilian in charge does not. Rumsfeld micromanages a LOT from everyone I have ever talked to, and it has nothing to do with resistance to change, and everything to do with tyranny by the strong-willed and powerful.

Just a few more thoughts....

V/R

Sanger M, thanks for your thoughts. Some responses posted here